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The rise of logistics is explained by three factors. The first factor is an economic one: The development 
of a mass consumption society. In European countries, one can observe mass motorization and a gradual 
expansion of the motorway networks between 1960 and 1990. These networks facilitated truck transport, 
leading to the development of cheap transport, warehousing and distribution of consumer goods. This 
development is part of a mass consumption society, i.e. logistics enable the development of mass 
consumption societies. Another driver towards transportation and logistics was the European traffic 
policy. In the 1950s, it enabled trucks to cross borders with full loads and to transit certain countries. Prior 
to 1980, the quotas for international truck traffic were regulated by bilateral agreements. But these quotas 
remained small. In the 1980s and 1990s, the European Union pursued a policy toward attaining a uniform 
market in the European Union. This pertained to the exchange of goods and for truck transportation 
services. The third factor refers to innovations in the parcel industry. In the 1990s, logistics and 
transportation changed fundamentally. We can almost speak of a logistics revolution caused by a co-
occurrence of various developments, much like the liberalization of the transport and telecommunications 
industries, the proliferation of internet technologies, the unification of Europe and the dissipation of 
communism, leading to a new orientation of logistics in the European market. 
 






In the last decades logistics changed fundamentally: from a microeconomic point of 
view, logistics developed from an auxiliary function in materials management to an 
independent factor of production that would go onto coordinate world-wide supply 
chains. From a macroeconomic point of view, the rise of the logistics sector as an 
important employment sector is fundamental and a force for deepening the division of 
labor. This paper explores the driving factors of the rise of logistics. It demonstrates 
how traffic policy of a gradually unified Europe shaped the development of logistics 
from its basic functions of transport, handling of cargo, and storage to the modern 
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concepts of high performance logistics, including concepts of organization of world 
wide supply chains and dimensions of quality in services, such as promptness and 
accuracy. Besides the political factor of the unification of Europe, one can identify an 
economic factor concerning the development of a consumer-oriented economy. The 
great variety of consumer goods was a challenge for the distribution logistics. As a third 
factor, the innovations in the parcel industry are considered where for the first time the 
flow of goods are linked to information technology to ensure speed and quality resulting 
in the “tracking and tracing technology”. The paper is based on the evaluation of 
research reports, monographs on traffic policy and national and European statistics. The 
rise of logistics has not drawn much attention of the scholars in the past. So this paper 
opens a new field of research. First we address to the consumer-oriented economy. 
The decades of the economic miracle in Western Europe after 1950, also called 
“trente glorieuses” or “miracolo economico”, mark an evolution of the consumer-
oriented economy in Europe, which not only addresses mass consumption but also the 
mass production and mass distribution of consumer goods (Strasser 1998). Mass 
production, mass distribution and mass consumption constitute a system. The 
automobile industry and the automobile trade, which form the basis of mass 
mobilization, play an important role within the consumer goods industry. The 
automobile cannot be viewed as only an important consumer good, but also as a product 
which enabled purchases in distant central markets and the comfortable transport of 
large amounts of consumer goods. It created the precondition for the focus on large 
scale entities in the retail trade. Other strong sectors of the consumption-based 
economic system are banking services, insurance services and services of the tourist 
industry. However, those sectors are less important for the supply of goods and are 
therefore neglected in this research. 
 
 
2. Mass motorization and the motorway network 
 
In the decades following 1950, mass motorization strongly contributed to the 
economic miracle in Western Europe.1 Automobile stock rose rapidly. In Western 
Germany, the growth rates of the 1950s amounted to 20 % per annum. Mass 
motorization got a fresh impulse from the reasonably priced, iconographic starter 
models: in Italy the Fiat 500, in France the Citroen 2CV, and in Western Germany the 
VW Beetle. The existing road system, which in many European countries did not 
include motorways, was unable to sustain the increasing motorization. There was said to 
be chaos and accidents on the roads.2 (Girnth, 1954). In response to the insufficient road 
network and the increasing influence of the auto lobby on traffic policy, European 
countries gradually extended the motorway network, which unburdened the roads and 
cross-town links and promised fast and comparably safe driving (Mom 2005, pp. 745-
772. Ross 1998, p. 86). The following table shows extension of the motorway network 
in the EU15 countries. 
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Table 1: Length of the motorway network in the EU15 in kilometres. 
Country/Year 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998 
Belgium  183 488 1.203 1.631 1.682 
Denmark  – 84 516 601 861 
Germany  2.671 6.061 9.225 10.809 11.427 
Spain – 387 2.008 4.693 8.269 
France 174 1.533 5.264 6.824 9.303 
Ireland – – – 26 103 
Italy 1.065 3.913 5.900 6.193 6.453 
Luxemburg – 7 44 78 115 
Netherland 358 1.209 1.780 2.092 2.360 
Austria – 478 938 1.445 1.613 
Portugal – 66 132 316 1.252 
Finland  – 108 204 225 473 
Sweden  – 403 850 939 1.339 
United Kingdom  202 1.183 2.683 3.180 3.421 
Source: Eurostat (2002a, p.1). Data for 1960 from World Road Congress (1969, p.51). 
 
The table shows how the pioneers of motorway construction – Italy and Germany – 
started already after 1950 to extend their motorway network substantially, compared to 
construction in France and England, where motorway construction was not pushed until 
the 1960s and 1970s (Moraglio 2007). Already by the 1950s, small countries such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands had substantially extended their motorway system in 
relation to their country size. Between 1950 and 1954, Western Germany only built 58 
kilometers of motorway and focused more on the repairing war damage. Expansion 
followed in the following years. Until 1961, 726 kilometers of motorway were built 
(Bundesminister für Verkehr 1961, p. 241). Despite little financial capital, the Federal 
Republic of Germany used the shadow budget as a way out in order to booster highway 
construction in the 1950s, which underscores the high priority of motorway construction 
(Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1955 pp. 166-179). 
 
 
3. The logistical function of motorways in the consumer-oriented economy 
 
The extension of the motorway network has not only served the automobile, but also 
the rapidity and economy of truck traffic. It gave a decisive impulse to the truck-based 
logistic systems. In the political debate about expansion of the highway system, two 
aspects - the transportation of people and the traffic of goods on the motorways - were 
viewed differently within European transport policy. In fact, German politics assigned 
goods transport to the railroad, and thereby pursued a twofold traffic policy: The 
motorway was mainly built for the automobile. However, this twofold traffic policy was 
short-sighted, as it did not address the economic rationalizing effects of truck traffic. 
Moreover, it impeded the development of logistics as a growing segment in the early 
phase of a service-oriented society: truck traffic decreased the costs and speeded up the 
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transport of goods. In Germany, this aspect was not even considered in the research of 
economic effects of the motorway until 1970.3 
In contrast to Germany, in Italy the aspect of rationalization of the goods traffic was 
one reason for the construction of motorways, and was appreciated as transport 
“modernization” since the railroad showed very poor performance (Bonino and 
Moraglio 2006). Capital investment in railway modernization focused on the area of 
passenger transportation, so that rolling material in freight haulage was no longer 
current. Moreover, the railway could not be integrated into a modern logistical concept 
of time-based competition, since the freight train did not run on schedule (Kerwer 2001, 
p. 173-216). In England, the construction of highways began with detour roads around 
the cities of Preston and Lancashire so that the cross-roads were cleared and goods 
traffic was accelerated. Charlesworth (1984, p.35) shows the lobby work of the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce. 
The development of truck traffic along the European motorway network is closely 
related to the evolution of modern logistical systems. Those evolved in the two main 
areas of the consumer-oriented economy: in the just-in-time delivery concept for 
automobile assembly facilities and in the build-up of modern distribution structures in 
the retail trade for the turn-over of goods in the already developed consumer goods 
industry. 
If one includes the automobile industry into the branch of the consumer goods 
industry, one can assert the thesis that the consumer-oriented economy is based on 
modern logistics and vice versa. A consumer-oriented economy is characterized by a 
differentiated offer of mass customized goods in a consumer market where customers 
have a large choice of offers. The deliveries of goods are urgent. A rapid change of 
fashion and models on the consumer goods markets and time-based deliveries to the 
automobile assembly facilities require transports without delay. In European transport 
networks, this is only possible via truck, as door-to-door-transports without transfer, 
while the railway slackens in this system of time and quality competition. 
The question concerning the development of distribution systems was put in context 
with the distribution of consumer goods, and was related to the expansion of department 
stores and the increasing presence of chain branches within the retail sector. For the first 
time, scientific marketing methods were implemented systematically in retail. Customer 
desires were to be scrutinized and, if necessary, sparked. Additionally, agile logistics 
had to deliver the goods to the store racks in time, in order to avoid empty racks which 
might cause antagonism and loss of customers, which is very easy on a consumer 
market that appears to have an almost unlimited offer of goods. This reveals a consumer 
orientation in modern logistics. In the academic theory of logistics, the location of 
production plants, as well as central and regional warehouses, was researched in order 
to minimize storage and transport costs and transport to the stores (ReVelle and Swain 
1970). 
The collapse of the Eastern bloc in the 1990s highlighted the different logistical 
structures in the East and West. In the following, the differences in transportation, 
logistics, and economic systems are to be revealed. The public economy of the Eastern 
bloc eliminated competition, preferred heavy industry and had the railway carry out 
transportation. Since its origin 175 years ago, heavy industry and railway have 
interacted. The railway’s transport performance in the Eastern bloc rose from 82 billion 
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tons kilometer in 1950 to 364 billion tons kilometer in 1980 (Dienel 1997, p. 404). The 
consumer goods industry, including automobile production, showed only weak 
performance. Poor motorization added no authority to the auto lobby in its effort to 
promote road construction. The problem of the lack of rural roads had been discussed in 
Russia since the 1920s, but had yet to be solved. The road network was in bad 
condition. Motorways existed – if any – only on short segments. The ambitious plans of 
the 1950s to build a motorway system from Western Russia to Central Europe was 
never achieved (Krüger 196, p. 157, Siegelbaum 2008, pp. 157-160).4 Due to the lack of 
a developed consumer goods industry, including distribution systems supported by 
trucks, there was no modern logistics in the Eastern bloc that could be characterized by 
rapidity, precision and a large quantity of goods. There was rather only an intermittent 
delivery of underserved markets, whereas the quality of the supply was secondary in an 
economy of scarcity. Nor was the punctuality of the delivery most important, but rather 
that the delivery arrive at all at some point. The extraordinary delivery deadline of 13 
years for a Trabant car in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) proves this aspect. 
Zatlin (2007) supports the thesis that the poor performance of the automobile industry 
has contributed decisively to the decline of the GDR. 
The Western European development program of the consumer-oriented economic 
system varied to a large degree from the structures of the Eastern bloc. With the 
exception of secured public or quasi-public sectors, the market economy regulated 
competition among service providers. The consumer goods industry and especially the 
automobile industry were very well-developed. The logistics of the developed consumer 
goods markets could profit from a close motorway network, to built-up structures of 
external suppliers in the automobile industry, and productive, truck-based distribution 
structures for the supply of a large variety of consumer goods.  
 
 
4. The automotive logistics of the automobile industry 
 
This section deals with the Europeanization of the automobile industry. It focuses on 
how the “automotive logistics” sector emerged. Growth and high earnings during the 
years of the economic miracle enabled the well-unionized work force of the automobile 
industry to implement high company tariffs. Management balanced high costs and 
affordable end products. The outsourcing of production and logistics I  nto sectors and 
countries with lower wages served as a way out of the cost trap. In 1988, the average 
hourly wage amounted to 18 euros for industrial workers in Germany, compared to 
Portugal where the hourly rate amounted to 3 euros (Eurostat 1989, p. 126). The transfer 
of warehouse operations and production supply processes to low-wage employees of the 
logistics trade lowered costs. This was the starting point for the development of just-in-
time-delivery and the outsourcing of parts production to low-wage countries in the 
1980s (Christopher 2005). Both developments gave a strong boost to the logistics 
industry to create a “modern logistics”, which extended the basic functions transport 
and storage with the aspect of quality: rapidity, punctuality, low error rates and process 
control with the help of computer networks were in demand. In logistics trade, the 
separate business segment “automotive logistics” was created, which complemented the 
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classical logistic functions with services and production steps, such as inventory 
management and re-ordering, packaging, pricing and pre-assembly.  
 
 
5. The railway transport in Europe 
 
Up to the year 2000, European railway societies maintained a cartel of national 
monopolists. The railways that belonged to the respective countries developed national 
transport markets for bulk goods within their countries. National orientation created a 
number of impediments for the establishment of a Europe-wide market for railway 
transport (European Conference of Ministers of Transport 1985. Stone 2003. Kopper 
2007). The market for railway rolling stocks in Europe was very fragmented within the 
separate countries. Consequently there were small, inefficient batches in orders of new 
wagons and locomotives. In railway engineering, there were 11 different power systems 
and 15 different operating systems within Europe. Along with that came national rules 
and standards for the operation of a particular railway, and the national language for the 
communication within the railway system – while in air traffic, English was already 
being used. Furthermore, the authorized axe load differed among the national networks, 
such that wagons of goods could not be used to full capacity. This fragmentation 
required a shift of the locomotives and the staff at the respective borders, causing long 
delays. Each railway made its own pricing system. The additional expenses incurred 
remained obscure, and there were different opinions on liability, contract duration, and 
terms of payment. 
Using the example of transalpine traffic between Germany, Austria, Switzerland and 
Italy, the problems of European railway cooperation can be demonstrated. At first, the 
railway was able to keep substantial market shares in competition with the truck due to 
the bottleneck at Alpine crossings. For a long time, rail was the most important means 
of transport for transalpine traffic, since in winter the mountainous crossings were 
almost insurmountable by truck. Significant use of the roads for goods traffic didn’t 
start until the expansion of motorways across the Alps. In the 1960s, 98 per cent of the 
transport between Germany and Italy was performed by the railway (Bayliss 1965, p. 
129). As a result, goods traffic via rail decreased year by year. In 1983, for the first 
time, more goods were transported via road than via rail in the Alpine rim.  
An important aspect which needs to be considered for the interpretation of 
competition between road and rail in transalpine traffic is the quality of the 
transportation. If quality is measured by rapidity and punctuality – an important 
parameter for just-in-time cooperation – then railway transports show many 
shortcomings due to locomotive shifts at the borders. According to the logistics-center 
in Prien at Lake Chiemsee, delays of over half an hour in truck traffic between Munich 
and Verona affected merely 2% of the trucks. For railway traffic, however, 20% of the 
freight trains were affected, which can be ascribed to the lack of coordination between 
the three railway organizations existing in Germany, Austria, and Italy which monitor 
the transfer of locomotives and staff at the borders. 
The motorway between Innsbruck and the Brenner Pass has a long construction 
history (Brenner-Autobahn AG 1972, pp. 469-482). Already by 1963, the “Bridge of 
Europe” close to Innsbruck had been completed. With its avant-garde highway chapel, it 
gave travelers comfort and hope in approaching the dangerous Alpine crossing. The 
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year 1972 was decisive for truck traffic in that the road between Bolzano and Verona 
was completed on the Italian side of the Alps. Due to motorway expansion, truck traffic 
showed explosive growth. In 1994, 132.8 million tons of goods crossed the Alpine rim, 
of which 50% accounts for transit, 15% for domestic traffic, and 35% for import and 
export traffic. Sixty-three per cent of the tonnages were transported via road and only 
37% via rail. With this, almost ten million trucks crossed the Alps each year. In 1980, 
Switzerland was still able to report that 93% of its transalpine goods traffic was 
transported via rail and only 7% via road. With the opening of the Gotthardt Tunnel in 
1980, goods traffic was relocated to the motorway A2. In 1994, the Swiss railway’s 
market share was down to 74% (Kracke 1997, p. 23). 
In order to limit truck traffic, transalpine goods traffic in Austria and Switzerland was 




6. Common traffic policy in Europe and the liberalization of truck traffic 
 
Border-crossing road freight transport in Europe was only made possible via a 
number of international institutions and agreements.5 The Economic Commission 
Europe (ECE), which organized the commission for domestic traffic, needs to be 
mentioned. Already prior to 1949, this commission had been enabling truck traffic. This 
was thanks to its convention on road traffic (also called “Freedom of Road”). Foreign 
trucks obtained the right to enter a country with their freight, whereas before the 
convention, the cargo had to be shifted to a domestic truck at the border (Schipper 
2007). The commission for domestic traffic coordinated the Marshall Plan’s aid supply 
which started in 1948. It also represented a field of policy for road and truck traffic 
expansion in order to compensate the railroad capacity constraint which followed the 
war. On May 19, 1956, the commission established the transport contract within the 
international road haulage (CMR), and the customs agreement on the international 
goods transport in sealed trucks with carnets TIR on 15 January, 1959. Therefore, 
custom checks for border-crossing transit transports became redundant. After all, the 
European conference of traffic ministers (CEMT), which was founded in Brussels in 
1953 by Italy, Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland, helped tremendously in 
coordinating traffic policy in Europe.6 It had the political goal of facilitating and easing 
the exchange of goods within Europe, and in 1960 it concluded an agreement at The 
Haag with respect to maximum size and weight of trucks. 
Beside oversight of the European Economic Commission, there were bilateral 
agreements between two countries regarding the amount of truck allocations. These 
were determined annually by representatives of the Ministries of Transport. If the 
contingents were spent, there could be no further truck traffic. This shows how 
restrictive and inflexible traffic allocation system was, especially with regard to the 
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European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 45 (2010): 1-14 
 8 
constantly growing exchange of goods within the European Economic Community 
EEC. 
The agreement for the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 
aimed at developing a joint traffic policy to ease transnational goods traffic and to 
abolish barriers confronting the exchange of goods. The EEC agreement, under Title IV 
(“The traffic”), articles 70 to 84, required the coordination of European traffic policies. 
Conditions were to be formulated, under which traffic companies throughout the EEC 
were able to work. In particular, article 79 inhibits the discrimination of transport 
conditions based solely on the country of origin or country of destination (Trinkaus 
1998, letter J211).7 Article 81 of the EEC agreement provides for a reduction in border 
taxes and fees. Articles 85 and 90 require free and fair competition in the economy, 
including the traffic sector. This was specified with the claim for free market access, the 
restraint of state subsidies, cartel bans, and the prohibition of abuse of power. However, 
it has been a long and difficult, 34-year way leading to the goal of a European-wide 
market with free access for transnational truck transport service. 
What is most surprising about the EEC agreement is its clear market-based 
orientation, which differs tremendously from the economic and traffic policies of the 
individual member countries. At the peak of the Cold War, this orientation was to be 
understood more as an ideological differentiation to the Eastern bloc than a maxim for 
domestic policy. Moreover, it needs to be emphasized that the regulations of the EEC 
and the European Union referred to transnational traffic. Separately, each individual 
country can regulate its domestic traffic. 
Traffic policy can draw on many instruments to regulate truck traffic.8 There are three 
categories of instruments: regulation of market access, price regulation and regulation of 
operation, while taxes for the operation of trucks, security standards for vehicles and 
drivers’ working condition are set. If control of market access is reduced to subjective 
entrepreneur qualifications and if pricing is not subject to state requirements, this is 
considered liberalization of truck road haulage. In contrast, the operative regulation of 
truck road haulage is understood as the legal regulation of truck operation. 
The common traffic policy of the EEC focused on truck traffic, which was easier to 
standardize than the area of railways, since these were state monopolies. In order to 
implement the requirements of Title IV of the EEC agreement pertaining to truck traffic, 
the EEC council of ministers had two main fields of policy: the liberalization and the 
harmonization of the operative truck road haulage regulations. Liberalization guarantees 
market access for foreign entrepreneurs in the home country, and creates competition in 
the hitherto isolated national markets. In the 1960s, truck industry regulation in the EEC 
countries showed varying levels. The countries which used the railway as an instrument 
for economic and social policy also combined regulation with a protection policy, 
restrictive licensing and price regulations. These countries include England, France, 
Belgium, and Germany. The Netherlands considered the transport sector as a regular 
economic sector without public obligations. Italy limited its railway policy to a deficit 
settlement (Bayliss 1965, p. 64). Harmonization alludes to the unification of national 
operative regulations. Differences distort competition and hinder the creation of a 
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 An example fort the discrimination is the transport of 100 tons steel plate. The prices for transportation 
via railway for a distance of 253 kilometers from Duisburg to Bingen amounted to 610 DM in July 1954. 
However, the price for a comparably long, but transnational roadway of 252 kilometers from Liege to 
Duisburg accounted for 378 DM. See Bayliss 1965, p. 11.  
8
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common traffic market. In the field of harmonization, the EEC launched a number of 
regulations (European Commission 2001, part 3). 
For decades, the EEC’s council of ministers was unable to put the liberalization 
requirements of Title IV of the agreement into practice, since some of the member 
countries initially aimed at harmonizing the terms of competition within the EEC. 
Among the member countries, Germany and France were interested in railway 
protection and used the broad harmonization policy to postpone liberalization. As a 
precondition, they combined liberalization with extensive harmonization. The 
Netherlands and England had already liberalized truck traffic at the end of the 1960s, 
and did not support railway-friendly politics. Hence, a conflict between harmonization 
supporters and liberalization advocates developed9 (Frerich and Müller 2004, p. 128). 
According to 1983 estimates of the European commission, high railway deficits 
influenced opinions on traffic policy in some member states and “initiated them to judge 
the politics towards other carriers mainly on the basis of their effect on the railway”. 
The commission suggested investigating road haulage for “further possibilities, how the 
supply could be adjusted to the demand, which made the present system for capacity 
checks unnecessary at the very end.” (Europäische Kommission 1983, p. 6 and 12). 
As the conflict between harmonization supporters and liberalization advocates in the 
Council of Ministers caused a blockade of traffic policy for years, the institutions of the 
EEC developed an unpredictable dynamic. On January 22, 1983, the European 
parliament filed suit against the Council of Ministers at the European Court of Justice 
for failure to act. On May 22, 1985, the European Court of Justice enunciated a 
judgment against the Council of Ministers for failure to act (Blonk 1985, p. 97). 
Between 1985 and 1986, the Council of Ministers made decisions for the liberalization 
of road haulage. The existing discrimination on the side of any third parties due to 
bilateral quotas of truck rides was abolished in January 1992 with the help of a 
progressive and noticeable increase in multilateral joint quotas. In 1990, the truck 
transport tariffs in transnational traffic, which were created to protect the railway, were 
abolished and free market rates were enacted. 
Compared to harmonization, which was subject to veto rule, liberalization was easier 
to achieve due to majority rule in the Council of Ministers. As a consequence, 
liberalization was realized without harmonization. For the establishment of equal 
market conditions, the important adjustment of truck taxes was not achieved until the 
turn of the millennium. In 1996, the tax burden for trucks in Europe ranged from 414 
DM in Finland to 5,286 DM in Austria.10 
As a result of liberalization, the truck fleet increased sharply to 15.7 million in the 
years between 1980 and 1990, and in 1998 reached just 20 million, whereas in the 
decade between 1970 and 1980, the number of trucks rose only by 3 million to 10.6 
million. From 1990 to 1999, traffic performance in the EU climbed from 790 to 1,258 
billion tons kilometer. This included 76% of traffic within distinct member states 
(Eurostat 2002a, p. 1 and Tronet 2002). Liberalization lowered transportation costs due 
to strong competition within individual countries. This enabled commercial freight 
haulage to secure its market share between 1985 and 1995 against transport on own 
account (“private carriers”). in all EU countries except Italy and Portugal. 
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 Data according to the Federation of German Long-Distance Hauliers. One US-Dollar equaled about 
2.50 DM in the 1980s. 
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7. The European Domestic Market as logistics promoter 
 
The establishment of the European Domestic Market on January 1, 1993, and the 
conversion of the EEC into the European Union (EU) involved the harmonization of 
fees, taxes, norms and regulations. Furthermore, it was characterized by the omission of 
border formalities for transnational freight haulage by truck. Until then, long delays at 
the borders were necessary for the compensation of various strict regulations in the 
member countries, which lead to long traffic jams for trucks.11 The detailed 
investigations of the Cecchini Commission revealed that trucking companies suffered a 
loss of € 8 billion due to internal administrative costs and delays at the borders. This 
corresponded to approximately 2% of transnational goods value (Cecchini 1988). The 
waiting period reflected the processing of required documents at the border. These 
documents were related to different sales taxes and excise taxes, as well as varied 
sanitary and veterinary regulations for consumables. Moreover, different technical 
norms fragmented the market and impeded free goods traffic. Since 1993, those barriers 
with the exchange of goods and services no longer apply, and trucks can cross the 
borders without stopping. 
The establishment of the European Domestic Market involved the liberalization of 
truck transport and lent strong support to the restructuring of a Europe-wide logistics 
and to the intensification of European division of labor. Industry locations and supplier 
plants could be dislocated because of powerful logistics. While until 1993, distribution 
systems of producers or trading firms were organized as national entities in Europe, the 
EU then enabled transition to a transnational form of organization with centers of 
distribution that were able to supply entire regions internationally. This can be best seen 
in the metropolitan areas of London, Paris, Brussels and Cologne. There are in total 
approximately 80 million consumers represented – while the regions around Paris, 
Brussels, and Cologne is also called “blue banana” in transport geography. A central 
warehouse in Brussels or Lille can supply consumers in less than 24 hours with a truck-
based supply network, making these locations very attractive for logistics in Europe. 
Since the opening of the Channel Tunnel (“Eurotunnel”) in 1994 (Gourvish 2006), the 
former mining town of Lille, is located in the center of the metropolitan areas. The 
connection Calais–Folkstone is built up with a commuter rail which transports trucks 
piggy-back through the tunnel. The train ride from Lille through the Eurotunnel to 
London takes 90 minutes, to Paris 60 minutes, and to Brussels 30 minutes. The rides via 
truck are comparable. In 1998, the commuter rail transported 704,000 trucks (Deutsche 
Verkehrszeitung, 6 February 1999). 
The European countries which were cut off from the European Economic Community 
(EEC) show paradigmatically how integration into the West has stimulated the 
transportation economy. For this reason, the motorway has been not only a means of 
transportation but also a political symbol of a new Europe. 
First of all, gradual integration into the European Union (EU) and expansion of the 
motorway network can be exemplified by Czechoslovakia, or the Czech Republic. 
While already in the 1930s, the Czech military realized the dangerous one-sided 
dependence of national defense on the railway, and tried to increase flexible transport 
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Government considered a truck’s hold of 1,200 meter length as necessary, see Bundestagsdrucksache 
10/5908, p. 2. 
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capacities with the truck, the country was, after 1945, initially subjected to the Soviet 
economic model (Oliva 2004). After 1980, the 300-kilometer long national motorway 
connection D1 between Prague – Brno – Bratislava could be put into service12. After the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc and the creation of the independent Czech Republic in 
1992, the construction of the motorway D5 Prague – Pilsen – German border started, 
which was finished in 2006. This motorway was a traffic and logistics connection 
between the Czech Republic and Germany. When the Czech Republic joined the EU in 
2004, the construction of the motorway between Prague and Dresden commenced. 
Second, a similar process is to be found in the post-Franco-era in Spain. In 1975, the 
end of Franco’s dictatorship, Spain had only motorways with a length of less than 1,000 
kilometers, which consisted of unconnected parts13. Most notably, the capital (Madrid) 
was not connected with any coastal city. In 1980, the highway system reached the 
length of 2,000 kilometers. After Spain’s entry into the EEC in 1986, the network was 
extended to more than 4,000 kilometers up until 1990 (see table 1). This had a direct 
impact on the transportation economy: In 1986, the number of trucks reached a value of 
1.6 million, and the number of new truck registrations multiplied from 128,000 to 
almost double the amount, to 215,000 in 1988.14 At the same time, the number of trucks 
which crossed the Pyrenees everyday increased from an average of 3,800 in 1986 to 
20,000 at the turn of the millennium.15 The traffic performance of the border-crossing 
traffic in Spain almost tripled from 12.2 billion tons kilometer in 1990 to 32.8 billion 
tons kilometer in 1998 (Eurostat 2002a, p.3). 
 
 
8. Parcel services as pacemaker for the logistics industry 
 
The evolution from the industrial to the consumer-oriented society has increased the 
importance of valuable manufactured goods compared to bulk goods, and was 
noticeable in the 1970s due to the increasing volume of sent parcels throughout Europe. 
During liberalization of transport markets in the US in the 1970s and 1980s, the parcel 
services UPS and Federal Express were founded, which pretty soon focused on a global 
operating area. The parcel services have created the package with a limited weight and 
limited measurements as a special segment of the transportation business. They built a 
network of cargo airplanes for long-distance transport, which was independent of the 
freight capacity of passenger airplanes (belly freight) (Campbell 2001). 
In the 1970s, parcel services started operating in Europe. In Western Germany, UPS 
had to make a huge investment for their market entry. This was due to the restrictive 
regulations within Germany’s road haulage law. Only local traffic companies were 
authorized within a radius of 50 kilometers. UPS had to buy many local traffic licenses 
to be able to operate in Western Germany.  
The parcel services were promoters and pacemakers of the whole logistics industry 
and, with various innovations, they have paved the way to high performance logistics. 
                                                 
12
 Data according to http://www.dalnice.com/. I thank Mr. Oliva at the University of Bordeaux for this 
advice. 
13
 Data according to ADAC Reisehandbuch 1975. 
14
 Data of new registrations in Spain according to the archive DaimlerChrysler, Stuttgart. I thank Mr. 
Heintzer for his valuable support. Inventory data in: The Europa year-book 1988, p. 2328. 
15
 Data according to Transport Consulting Nea, Amsterdam. 
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They have defined the basic parcel and introduced the objective of standardization to 
the transport industry. They have tightened transport, achieving domestic delivery 
within 24 hours, while traditional packaged goods networks show a delivery time of 
three days. They have implemented measures to guarantee the quality of service. They 
were one of the first industries to use barcodes, enabling the tracking and 
documentation of parcels within the system. In marketing, they introduced simple 
pricing models so that the customer could calculate the transport costs in advance. The 
complicated pricing models from the era of railway logistics have been overcome. 
Up to 2000, parcel services showed high growth rates. They acted as competitors in 
the packaged goods sector and made much cargo shift to the parcel segment. 
 
 
9. Conclusion: The Logistic Revolution 
 
In the 1990s, logistics and transportation changed fundamentally: from a 
microeconomic point of view, logistics and transportation developed from an auxiliary 
function in materials management to an independent factor of production that would go 
onto coordinate world-wide supply chains. From a macroeconomic point of view, the 
rise of the logistics and transportation sector as an important employment sector is 
fundamental and a force for deepening the division of labor. We can almost speak of a 
logistics revolution caused by a co-occurrence of various developments: 
1. The deregulation of truck haulage markets, air traffic markets, telecommunication 
markets and mailing markets coincided in the 1990s and strongly affected the 
private supply of logistics services in the transport industry, parcel services, and 
telecommunication services, all of which were responsible for the management of 
logistic networks. 
2. The consumer-oriented economy has caused an increased variety of models in 
materials management, and has heightened the complexity of logistical processes 
in production and trade. Haulers as logistics service providers have been 
integrated into production processes.  
3. Political developments have lead to a strategic realignment of distribution 
systems. Both the European domestic market, the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and 
the establishment of a market-based national economy required a new evaluation 
of previous logistical concepts in purchasing and sales. In this context, we can 
also speak of “Euro-Logistics”. 
4. The process of globalization has established sites for the production of consumer 
goods outside of Europe and, at the same time, it has reduced transportation costs 
to a large extent because of the containerization of the global trade (Levinson 
2006). Consumer goods trading took advantage of this new constellation and 
goods at the new production sites could be bought. This policy required a special 
import logistics in the harbors and a distribution logistics linked to it. 
5. The concentration in food retail has grown considerably within the past years. 
Retail companies have built up their own specialized logistics systems.  
6. Internet-based information systems, created in the 1990s, have drastically 
simplified and cheapened the exchange of information. They have contributed to 
the acceleration and precise management of material flows in the logistics supply 
chain. Internet-based mail order businesses have strengthened parcel services.   
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7. The reliability and affordability of transport processes, which accompanied the 
logistics revolution, has increased the division of labor between the various 
production stages, leading to a displacement of production sites and to their 
integration into supply chains. This influence of modern logistics concepts on 
national economies is summarized by the term “logistics effect”. 
The logistics revolution has been complemented theoretically by the concept of 
Supply Chain Management created in the 1990s, which takes the entire and probably 
global supply chain into account instead of optimizing an economic function just 
locally. With this approach, the logistic revolution has found its theoretical conclusion 
(Christopher 2005). 
The development of logistics was up to the year 2000 a classical success story. There 
seemed to be no high barriers against expansion. But, many traffic experts saw the rise 
of truck traffic within Europe critical, taking the environmental costs of truck transport 
into account. In the European Community a long debate arose, how to identify and to 
charge these costs as part of the motorway toll. But before the year 2000, in Germany 
one could drive a truck on a motorway without any toll. Also car drivers and the public 
regarded trucks as troublemakers and exerted pressure on politics to restrain trucking. 
The consumers demanded on the one hand a broad selection in the shops, but did not 
recognize, that this service was almost impossible without truck delivery – at least when 
the railways did not provide service of high quality. Austria and Switzerland imposed 
many restrictions on Alps crossing truck traffic. The issue of “green logistics” with a 
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